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RECENT CASES
DECEDENTS' ESTATES-TESTAENTARY TRUST-CoNSIDERATION OF
BENEFICIARY'S PRIVATE MEANS IRRELEVANT TO DECISION To INVADE PRINCIPAL
In 1959 Walter L. Johnson died leaving a will from which the testator's
widow received outright, property valued at $65,119.32. The residue of the
estate ($17,189.58) was divided in half and given in trust to the widow
and testator's daughter. As surviving joint tenant of a bank account the widow
also received $73,135.84. By the terms of the will the widow was to receive
the income from her trust and, if the trustees found that the income from the
trust was not "adequate for the comfortable support and maintenance" of the
widow, they were to invade the principal to the extent they "deem necessary and
proper for the comfortable support and maintenance" of the widow. In no
event, however, was the invasion to exceed 3,000 dollars per annum. Upon the
death of the widow the remainder of her trust was to go to the daughter's trust.
The terms of the daughter's trust were similar except that (1) the trustees were
given discretion to invade the corpus only when they found that the income from
the trust "together with other assets at her [the testator's daughter's] disposal"
were inadequate for her comfortable support and maintenance, (2) there-was no
maximum set on the invasion, and (3) there were no remainder provisions. In
the year of the testator's death the widow suffered a cerebral vascular accident
and because of its effects was adjudged an incompetent in the same year. The
medical expenses arising from the accident until the time of the widow's death in
1964 totalled 92,000 dollars. The private income of the widow would account for
less than half of this amount, and if the trustees were allowed to invade the
corpus, they would have depleted it. During her life the widow was paid the
trust income but at no time was the principal invaded. After the widow's death
the trustee sought to transfer the corpus of her trust to the trust of the daughter
in accordance with the terms of the will. The widow's estate, however, made
claim for the maximum invasion for each year of the widow's life after the
death of the testator. Held, the trust, giving to the widow the income of the
trust plus such amount of the principal as the trustees deem necessary for her
proper support, was an absolute gift of support and invasion of the principal
was not to be dependent upon a showing of inadequacy of the widow's own
means; the other income of the widow is irrelevant to the decision to invade the
principal; and it would be an abuse of the discretion of the trustees not to
invade the principal to the maximum. Matter of Johnson, 46 Misc. 2d 52, 258
N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sur. Ct. 1965).
The major problem involved in this case is whether the trustees, in deciding
whether to invade the corpus of a testamentary'trust, should take into consideration the private means of the beneficiary or whether such means must be disregarded. From the few cases that have reached the Court of Appeals a basic
legal principle has evolved. It is said that if the will constitutes an absolute gift
of support, the private income of the beneficiary is immaterial to the trustees'
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consideration. 1 If, however, the gift is one that is conditioned upon the need 2
of the beneficiary, the independent means of the beneficiary must be considered.
Once we have this "rule" we are immediately confronted with the question of
determining when a trust is an absolute gift of support and when it is con4
ditioned upon need. The answer is to be found in the intention of the testator.
When the language used in the will is clear, the intention of the testator is said
to have been embodied in the instrument and it must be given effect.3 When,
however, the terms of the will are vague or ambiguous, discerning the intention
of the testator becomes a more difficult proposition. The difficulty has resulted in
the drawing of various courts to two poles with various gradations between the
two. Some courts rely solely on the language of the will and try to resolve the
ambiguity from within the "four corners" of the instrument.0 Other courts,
however, decide the issue not only from the words used, but also from the extrinsic
circumstances and conditions surrounding the execution of the will.7 Because
of this difference in approach, various factors have been found to be controlling;
and factors found governing in one case are very often ignored in others. 8
Those courts that feel the intention of the testator must be found in the
instrument alone have placed greater weight upon specific words and grammatical constructionsY In many of the cases finding an absolute gift of support, the
following factors have been found to be of much significance: (1) words similar
to those used in the instant case, i.e., if income should prove insufficient, the
1. Matter of Clark, 280 N.Y. 155, 19 N.E.2d 1001 (1939).
2. A gift conditioned upon need is a gift of the income of the trust plus so much of the
trust principal as is needed for the support of the beneficiary if the beneficiary's own sources
should prove inadequate. See Matter of Johnson, 123 Misc. 834, 207 N.Y. Supp. 66 (Surr.
Ct. 1924).
3. Matter of Martin, 269 N.Y. 305, 199 N.E. 491 (1936).
4. Matter of Clark, 280 N.Y. 155, 19 N.E.2d 1001 (1939); Matter of Bouvier, 205
Misc. 974, 129 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Surr. Ct. 1954); Matter of Hart, 189 Misc. 171, 71 N.Y.S.2d
488 (Surr. Ct. 1947); Matter of Sharp, 137 Misc. 644, 244 N.Y. Supp. 566 (Surr. Ct. 1930);
Matter of Niles, 122 Misc. 17, 202 N.Y. Supp. 475 (Surr. Ct. 1923). See also Halbach,
Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1425, 1442 (1961); 11
Scott, Trusts, § 128.4 (1958).
5. Matter of Clark, supra note 4; Glanckopf v. Guaranty Trust Co., 274 App. Div.
39, 80 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1st Dep't 1948); Matter of Gatehouse, 149 Misc. 648, 267 N.Y. Supp. 808
(Surr. Ct. 1933).
6. See, e.g., Matter of Clark, supra note 4; Matter of Levison, 29 Misc. 2d 697, 215
N.Y.S.2d 374 (Surr. Ct. 1961) ; Matter of Paster, 22 Misc. 2d 4, 198 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Surr. Ct.
1960); In re Cameron's Trusts, 127 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Surr. Ct. 1954); Matter of Gatehouse,
supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., Matter of Briggs, 180 App. Div. 752, 168 N.Y. Supp. 597 (3d Dep't 1917);
Matter of Bouvier, 205 Misc. 974, 129 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Surr. Ct. 1954) ; In re Cowee's Will, 120
N.Y.S.2d 674 (Surr. Ct. 1953); In re Coghlan, 72 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Surr. Ct. 1947); Matter of
Sharp, 137 Misc. 644, 244 N.Y. Supp. 566 (Surr. Ct. 1930); Matter of White, 125 Misc.
901, 212 N.Y. Supp. 267 (Surr. Ct. 1925).
8. See Halbach, supra note 4 at 1443.
9. See, e.g., Matter of Clark, 280 N.Y. 155, 19 N.E.2d 1001 (1939); Matter of
Hogeboom, 219 App. Div. 131, 219 N.Y. Supp. 436 (3d Dep't 1927); Matter of Aschner,
43 Misc. 2d 809, 252 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Surr. Ct. 1964); Matter of Paster, 22 Misc. 2d 4, 198
N.Y.S.2d 441 (Surr. Ct. 1960); In re Cass, 68 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Surr. Ct. 1946); Matter of
Hart, 189 Misc. 171, 71 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Surr. Ct. 1947); Matter of Gatehouse, 149 Misc.
648, 267 N.Y. Supp. 808 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Matter of Johnson, 123 Misc. 834, 207 N.Y. Supp.
66 (Surr. Ct. 1924).
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trustees may invade the principal to the extent they deem necessary, with
"insufficient" and "necessary" being the key words;' 0 (2) terms of the will
directing that "whatever is left" of the principal of the beneficiary's trust be
given to the remainderman; i i and (3) the combining of income and invasion
of principal clauses in the same sentence. 12 Finally, a clause in the will placing
the discretionary power to invade the principal in the beneficiary is held to

13
indicate an absolute gift.

Likewise there is language which the courts interpret as indicating an intention on the part of the testator that the invasion should be predicated upon a
showing of need. In this respect clauses allowing invasion to the extent of
"need" or to the extent that the beneficiary may "require" for proper support'4
or "'any words of condition or words imparting need are especially likely to be
stressed as requiring consideration of other resources"' 15 as is the appearance of
elaborate provisions for the remaindermen. 16
At the other pole are the courts that attempt to find the intention of the
testator not only from the language of the will but also from other extrinsic
factors surrounding the execution of the will. The factors that have tended to
sway the court toward a decision that the testator intended the trust as an
absolute gift of support are: (1) the beneficiary is the widow 17 of the testator
or was in close relationship with the testator and perhaps previously depended
upon the testator for support because of incompetency, advancing age, infancy,
10. See, e.g., Matter of Clark, 280 N.Y. 155, 19 N.E.2d 1001 (1939); Rezzemini v.
Brooks, 236 N.Y. 184, 140 N.E. 237 (1923); Matter of Aschner, supra note 9 (arguing that
the word "necessary" must be taken to relate to the definition of support rather than a
limitation upon the invasion of the corpus); In re Coghlan, 72 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Surr. Ct. 1947) ;
Matter of Gatehouse, supra note 9; but see Matter of Sharp, 137 Misc. 644, 244 N.Y.
Supp. 566 (Surr. Ct. 1930); Matter of Niles, 122 Misc. 17, 202 N.Y. Supp. 475 (Surr. Ct.
1923); Many recent cases simply base their decision on previous case rulings. See, e.g.,
Matter of Grubel, 37 Misc. 2d 910, 235 N.Y.S.2d 21 (Surr. Ct. 1962).
11. The rationale here seems to be that the testator has acknowledged his intention
that the principal be invaded and shows an obvious lack of concern for the remainderman.
See, Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236 N.Y. 184, 140 N.E. 237 (1923); In re Cowee's Will, 120
N.Y.S.2d 674 (Surr. Ct. 1953); Matter of Gatehouse, supra note 9.
12. It re Cowee's Will, supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., Matter of Springett, 25 Misc. 2d 68, 206 N.Y.S.2d 48 (Surr. Ct. 1960);
Matter of Lyon, 192 Misc. 306, 80 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Surr. Ct. 1948); In re Ginnever's Estate,
69 N.Y.S.2d 452 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
14. The theory here is that the invasion is based upon the need of the beneficiary
and does not depend upon the insufficiency of the income of the trust. See, e.g., Matter of
Martin, 269 N.Y. 305, 199 N.E. 491 (1936); In re Aldrich's Estate, 140 N.Y.S.2d 182
(Surr. Ct. 1955); In re Cass, 68 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Surr. Ct. 1946); Matter of Johnson, 123
Misc. 834, 207 N.Y. Supp. 66 (Surr. Ct. 1924).
15. Halbach, supra note 4 at 1447.
16. Because it shows a concern for the remainderman on the part of the testator. See
l re Aldrich's Estate, 140 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Surr. Ct. 1955) ; Matter of Sharp, 137 Misc. 644,
244 N.Y. Supp. 566 (Surr. Ct. 1930).
17. See Matter of Grubel, 37 Misc. 2d 910, 235 N.Y.S.2d 21 (Surr. Ct. 1962); Matter
of Bedell, 196 Misc. 227, 92 N.Y.S.2d 70 (Surr. Ct. 1949) (where -the rationale would
appear to be that the husband naturally intended to provide for the support of his wife
regardless of her means); In re Coghlan, 72 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Surr. Ct. 1947) ; In re Kohlman's
Estate, 60 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Surr. Ct. 1946); In re Block's Estate, 57 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup. Ct.
1941); Matter of Gatehouse, 149 Misc. 648, 267 N.Y. Supp. 808 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
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or other reasons' s and (2) the remainderman of the trust is someone or something with which the testator had little previous concern or connection.1"
Certain factors militate against an intent to bequeath an absolute gift of
support. It has been found that the testator intended a gift conditioned upon
need, if (1) the testator had not previously provided for the support of the
beneficiary 20 and/or the beneficiary has the physical ability to provide for
himself; 21 or (2) if the beneficiary had received considerable other assets from
the will; 22 or (3) if at the time of the execution of the will the testator knew of
other assets available to the beneficiary; 23 or (4) if the size of the trust is small
and insufficient to maintain full support for any length of time without depleting the trust.24
When all the cases are considered a general pattern seems to exist. Whenever the beneficiary is a widow, or one of close relation to the testator who had
previously depended upon the testator for support, or an incompetent, the
courts have seemed willing to find an absolute gift of support.25 If the beneficiary
does not have this close or exceptional relationship and has sufficient independent
funds,2 6 or if the beneficiary is physically and mentally competent to provide for
himself,2 7 the courts usually come to the opposite conclusion.
The court in the instant case recognized that its decision as to whether the
widow's trust should be transferred to the daughter's trust or be invaded for
the benefit of the widow's estate depended upon the preliminary question of
whether the testator intended the trust to be one of an absolute gift of support
or one conditioned upon need. Apparently using the approach that the intention
18. See, e.g., Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236 N.Y. 184, 140 N.E. 237 (1923) (paralytic and
incompetent son); Holden v. Strong, 116 N.Y. 471, 22 N.E. 960 (1889) (son with history
of insanity) ; Matter of Hart, 189 Misc. 171, 71 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Surr. Ct. 1947) (dependent
70-year-old sister).
19. See In re Coghlan, 72 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Surr. Ct. 1947); Matter of Hart, supra note
18. But see, In re Mayer's Will, 59 N.Y.S.2d 561 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
20. See Matter of Briggs, 180 App. Div. 752, 168 N.Y. Supp. 597 (3d Dep't 1917);
Matter of Levison, 29 Misc. 2d 697, 215 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Surr. Ct. 1961); Matter of Hart,
supra note 18; In re Cass, 68 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
21. In re Cowee's Will, 120 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Surr. Ct. 1953) ; Matter of Kelly, 166 Misc.
774, 3 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Surr. Ct. 1938); Matter of White, 125 Misc. 901, 212 N.Y. Supp.
267 (Surr. Ct. 1925); Matter of Briggs, supra note 20. But see, Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236
N.Y. 184, 140 N.E. 237 (1923).
22. See Matter of Kelly, supra note 21; In re Aldrich's Estate, 140 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Surr.
Ct. 1955); In re Cowee's Will, supra note 21.
23. See Matter of Briggs, 180 App. Div. 752, 168 N.Y. Supp. 597 (3d Dep't 1917); In re
Aldrich's Estate, 140 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Surr. Ct. 1955); Matter of Sharp, 137 Misc. 644, 244
N.Y. Supp. 566 (Surr. Ct. 1930); Matter of White, 125 Misc. 901, 212 N.Y. Supp. 267 (Surr.
Ct. 1925).
24. See Matter of Garret, 9 A.D.2d 545, 190 N.Y.S.2d 758 (2d Dep't 1959); Matter
of Niles, 122 Misc. 17, 202 N.Y. Supp. 475 (Surr. Ct. 1923) ; Matter of Sharp, supra note 23;
There are a small number of cases that depend neither upon language nor extrinsic factors
existing at the time of the execution of the will. In these cases the courts have permitted
invasion on the basis that not to do so would completely exhaust all of the assets of the
beneficiary, and this cannot be allowed. See Matter of Bouvier, 205 Misc. 974, 129 N.Y.S.2d
542 (Surr. Ct. 1954); Matter of Hoepner, 176 Misc. 47, 27 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
25. See cases cited supra notes 16, 17.
26. See cases cited supra notes 21, 22.
27. See cases cited supra note 20.
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of the testator should be determined solely from the language of the instrument,
the court compared the language used in the instant case with that found in the
will considered in Matter of Clark.28 Since the gift in Clark was held to be
absolute, and the invasion clauses of the two wills were similar, the court in the
instant case concluded that the trust here likewise set up an absolute gift of
support and held that in light of the existing conditions it would be an abuse of
discretion for the trustees not to invade the principal to the maximum. Although
having already "determined that the language of the will is sufficiently similar to
many cases reaching the same conclusion, so that no further support for its
decision is necessary," the court mentions "two other arguments to support the
conclusion." 20 First, the court pointed out that in the daughter's trust there
was specific direction to the trustees to consider the other income of the
daughter before invading the principal. This directive was lacking in the widow's
trust and this "distinction in language makes the court believe that the draftsman was aware of the different interpretations that would be given to the two
different paragraphs." 30 Secondly, the court reasoned that even if it had followed
the decision in Matter of Martin3' (holding that the private sources of the
beneficiary must be considered before invasion) the practical effect would have
been the same. For even if the widow's private income was considered and added
to the income from the trust, the sum would not be sufficient to cover the medical
and living expenses incurred by the widow.
It is difficult to find any faults in the logic of the court in the instant case
once we have accepted the proposition that the intention of the testator here
can be gathered by comparing the language he used and the language used in a
different will. It may be true that the language of the two wills is similar, but it
is quite another thing to say that the intentions of the testators are the same.
By using the similarity of language as the basis for its decision and ignoring its
own advice "that no will requiring a determination by a court as to its construction is twin to another will requiring such determination by a court," 32 the court
has failed to take into consideration other factors that would seem to indicate
a different intention. Besides the trust fund, the testator willed to his widow
$65,119.32, and as the surviving joint tenant of a bank account, the widow
also received $73,135.84. This left the widow with a total of $138,255.16 at
her disposal. The wide difference between the amount received outright and the
amount of the trust fund ($8,594.79) would indicate that the testator intended
the trust fund to be a reserve for the widow and the large sum to be used for
her support. It could be argued that if the trust were a reserve, it would
28. 280 N.Y. 155, 19 N.E.2d 1001 (1939). The relevant clause of the will there read:
"In the event that the income . . . shall . . . be insufficient for her every comfort and
support, I authorize my said trustee to pay . . . such portion of the principal . . . as it

shall from time to time deem necessary." Id. at 158-59, 19 N.E.2d at 1002.
29. Instant case at 57, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 928.

30. Ibid.
31.

269 N.Y. 305, 199 N.E. 491 (1936).

32. Instant case at 53, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
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indicate that the testator intended that the widow be able to spend the outright
gift in any manner she wished while relying on the reserve for her support.
This latter argument is considerably weakened by observing the size of the
trust fund. The trust, if used for the absolute support of the widow, could be
so used for a very short number of years before being completely depleted.
It is not reasonable to ascribe such an intention to the testator. Also, the
rather obvious concern for the remainderman would indicate that the testator
wished the principal to remain intact. But, as was pointed out, the court did
find two other arguments to support its decision. The first being that the
draftsman was aware of the different interpretations that would be given to
the words creating the widow's and the daughter's trusts. If such an awareness
can be assumed, it is difficult to understand why it was not made clear in
the widow's trust. The second supporting argument is that "the same conclusion could well be reached following Matter of Martin." The court can use this
argument only by making a sharp distinction between the income from the
private assets of the beneficiary and the assets themselves. Matter of Martin,
upon which the instant court relies, is not as clear on this distinction. Obviously,
if the trustees are restricted to looking only at "income" rather than total
assets, the result in the instant case would be the same following either Martin
or Clark. If total assets can be considered, however, the results would differ.
and income and it has
The courts have not made this distinction between 3assets
3
been indicated that this distinction cannot be made.
"A glance at the digests will show that this problem continues to plague
'34
the courts and probably will do so as long as variations in language occur."
The courts of New York have done little to alleviate it. The Court of Appeals
has not taken a case dealing with precisely this problem since 1939, 35 and the
lower courts have done little to clarify the situation. This has resulted in a situation where it is almost impossible to predict the outcome of any one case where
an ambiguous clause is present. Factors that seem important in one case appear
to have no relevancy in the next, even though there is no substantial difference in
36
the language of the two wills.
Part of the fault for the situation, of course, must be with the draftsman,
i.e. the lawyers. Even with confusing and unpredictable decisions, the lawyers
continue to employ imprecise language. The reason for the use of this vague
language is difficult to find, but perhaps it is the settled convenience of using
printed forms. A look at some of the Form Books in common usage will show
the possible sources of some of the language employed in these wills.3 7 Much of
33. See Matter of Martin, 269 N.Y. 305, 199 N.E. 491 (1936); Matter of Hogeboom,
219 App. Div. 131, 219 N.Y. Supp. 436 (3d Dep't 1927).
34. Instant case at 56, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
35. The last case on point was Matter of Clark, 280 N.Y. 155, 19 N.E.2d 1001 (1939).
36. See generally, Holbach, supra note 4.
37. See Modem Legal Forms §§ 10040, 1023.1 (1965); 12 Am. jur. Legal Forms 1171
(1955). A better form is 13 Marke, Bender's Forms § 2509 (1961).
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the confusion existing in'the court today could be eliminated if draftsmen would
use more precise language in recording the intentions of the testator.
Other states also have had to face the same problem and have, in many
instances, experienced similar difficulties. From the reported cases, it appears
that some states find it less difficult to look at the circumstances surrounding
the will and are more likely to find a trust conditioned upon need than are the
New York courts. 8 A Connecticut case has declared that there is a "... general
rule requiring that other resources of the beneficiary, both principal and income,
must be substantially exhausted before any invasion of the corpus is author3
ized.1 9

The A.L.I. Restatement of the Law of Trusts, however, says that there is
an inference that the "beneficiary is entitled to support out of the trust fund
even though he has other resources." 40
Where does this leave us? Perhaps a Minnesota judge best summed up the
situation when he wrote, "nothing would be accomplished by attempting to
discuss or reconcile the cases on this subject. About all that can be said is that
authorities may be found to support any view." 41 Unfortunately, this situation
exists in New York. The way the law on this subject stands today, it is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty the outcome of any one case. This
situation results in great difficulty for the lawyer trying to handle this type of
will, and for the trustee in trying to decide whether to invade the principal or
not.4 2 The parties to the will also are put in positions of great inconvenience.
Some definite statement on this problem is needed and should be given.
It is submitted that there should be a presumption, or inference, of a gift
conditioned upon need unless there is specific language to the contrary. First, the
presumption would give some certainty in a very confusing field. Secondly, this
seems the most equitable solution. If the principal is needed by the beneficiary,
it can and should be invaded. If, however, the beneficiary has income and
assets sufficient to provide for himself, there seems to be little reason for invading
the corpus to the detriment of the remainderman unless the intention of the
testator was clearly expressed. In any event this presumption can be rebutted by
a clear showing of intent to the contrary on the part of the testator.
ROBERT M. KIEBALA
38. See, e.g., Dunklee v. Kettering, 123 Colo. 43, 225 P.2d 853 (1950); Stempel v.
Middletown Trust Co., 127 Conn. 206, 15 A.2d 305 (1940); Lumbert v. Fischer, 245 Mass.
190, 139 N.E. 446 (1923); First Natl Bank v. Howard, 149 Tex. 130, 229 S.W.2d 781
(1950); Matter of Leonard, 115 Vt. 440, 63 A.2d 179 (1949).
39. Guarantee Trust Co. v. New York City Cancer Comm., 145 Conn. 542, 144 A.2d
535, 537 (1958) (Emphasis added.). Further, the A.L.R. has declared that, "By the weight
of authority, unless the language of the trust instrument affirmatively reveals an intention to
make a gift of the stated benefaction regardless of the beneficiary's other means, the trustee
should consider such other means in exercising his discretion to disburse the principal for the
purpose." Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 1383, 1432 (1948). (Emphasis added.)
40. Restatement (Second), Trusts § 128 (1959).
41. ln re Tuthill's Will, 247 Minn. 122, 126, 76 N.W.2d 499, 502 (1956).
42. For a brief account of the problems facing the trustee, see, McLucas, Discretionary
Trusts, Trusts and Estates, March 1958.

